Missing light aircraft in the NT
Guys…..
Although all this talk of Va, fatigue and so on is a valid discussion to have in general, I think it’s a bit premature in the case of this accident. Apart from one or two very inconclusive media photos, there is nothing that I am aware of to indicate what the cause of the accident was. So why are we all talking about in flight break ups, when we have no idea yet if that is even what happened?
A couple of the previous accidents mentioned in this thread were pretty close to home for me, and I fully agree that this is a conversation that we, as an industry, need to have at some stage. But I also know how aggravating it is, when you’ve just lost a colleague or friend in a situation like this, to find yourself reading speculative online comments regarding the cause of the accident or PIC’s supposed lack of knowledge or training, when the people commenting are not yet in a position to know. Out of professional respect for the PIC and their family, friends and colleagues, I would humbly suggest that we hold off on this discussion until at least some of the facts are known.
Fly safe, everyone.
Although all this talk of Va, fatigue and so on is a valid discussion to have in general, I think it’s a bit premature in the case of this accident. Apart from one or two very inconclusive media photos, there is nothing that I am aware of to indicate what the cause of the accident was. So why are we all talking about in flight break ups, when we have no idea yet if that is even what happened?
A couple of the previous accidents mentioned in this thread were pretty close to home for me, and I fully agree that this is a conversation that we, as an industry, need to have at some stage. But I also know how aggravating it is, when you’ve just lost a colleague or friend in a situation like this, to find yourself reading speculative online comments regarding the cause of the accident or PIC’s supposed lack of knowledge or training, when the people commenting are not yet in a position to know. Out of professional respect for the PIC and their family, friends and colleagues, I would humbly suggest that we hold off on this discussion until at least some of the facts are known.
Fly safe, everyone.
If that is the crash, it is not footage I have seen before and does not resemble controlled flight to the ground.
Given the lack of coverage of this accident & that video being shown by the "media" not much else currently passes the pub test. So currently we ask How & Why - as we always do.
The following users liked this post:
Noted NACA/NASA test pilot Scott Crossfield (X-1, X-15, dead sticked an F-100 - something company test pilots doubted could be done) lost his life when his 210A broke up. NTSB finding - "The pilot's failure to obtain updated en route weather information, which resulted in his continued instrument flight into a widespread area of severe convective activity, and the air traffic controller's failure to provide adverse weather avoidance assistance, as required by Federal Aviation Administration directives, both of which led to the airplane's encounter with a severe thunderstorm and subsequent loss of control."
Folk turn all sorts of airframes into scrap metal which then rains down from the atmosphere, nothing unique to the 210.
Folk turn all sorts of airframes into scrap metal which then rains down from the atmosphere, nothing unique to the 210.
His was a 1961 Cessna 210A which was the first of the 210s and had struts. The 210 design does not and will not stand up to high G loading in turbulence anywhere close to normal cruise speed. Its a great plane to fly but an easy plane to fly apart
Those in the NT at the time will remember the Anindiyakwa Conquest that flew into a Thunderie.
A testament to a well built aircraft.
It shows what a Thunderie can do to an aircraft. Every leading edge looked like it had been hit with an ice pick, any fibre glass fairing gone. Now I maybe wrong on this part but the tail/empanage twisted.
Again memory could be wrong but Cessna didn’t write it off but rebuilt it, showing how tonka tough it was.
Now put a Cessna 210 into that same Thunderie…
The conquest pilot got into a situation he shouldn’t have been in and got away with it, a lesser built aircraft?
What’s my point?
A testament to a well built aircraft.
It shows what a Thunderie can do to an aircraft. Every leading edge looked like it had been hit with an ice pick, any fibre glass fairing gone. Now I maybe wrong on this part but the tail/empanage twisted.
Again memory could be wrong but Cessna didn’t write it off but rebuilt it, showing how tonka tough it was.
Now put a Cessna 210 into that same Thunderie…
The conquest pilot got into a situation he shouldn’t have been in and got away with it, a lesser built aircraft?
What’s my point?
That by the time someone is flying a Conquest, they are able to say "no" to a flight even when the operator pressures them to fly anyway, discounts their concerns, and demands Please Explains when a pilot diverts around poor weather.
My point is the power of a Thunderie!
If nature has the power to do that to a truck then a 210………
I am going to speculate on the 210, that the pressure placed staff to fly, vs the amount of support a pilot would have for deciding not to fly, is the major contributing factor in this crash.
Thread Starter
Agree 100%. I’m not going to speculate on the conquest, but those who knew, knew it was an error. Certainly not pressure to operate, it was the best operator in the NT at the time.
My point is the power of a Thunderie!
If nature has the power to do that to a truck then a 210………
My point is the power of a Thunderie!
If nature has the power to do that to a truck then a 210………
A lot of the rubbish that’s being posted here is absolutely inappropriate discussion at this time - Absolutely disgraceful!
Time some of you old timers get off the keyboard and reminisce elsewhere.
My phone number hasn’t changed JT, call me to discuss further if you don’t agree😀😀😀😀😀
Cheers,
Craig
Those in the NT at the time will remember the Anindiyakwa Conquest that flew into a Thunderie.
A testament to a well built aircraft.
It shows what a Thunderie can do to an aircraft. Every leading edge looked like it had been hit with an ice pick, any fibre glass fairing gone. Now I maybe wrong on this part but the tail/empanage twisted.
Again memory could be wrong but Cessna didn’t write it off but rebuilt it, showing how tonka tough it was.
Now put a Cessna 210 into that same Thunderie…
The conquest pilot got into a situation he shouldn’t have been in and got away with it, a lesser built aircraft?
What’s my point?
A testament to a well built aircraft.
It shows what a Thunderie can do to an aircraft. Every leading edge looked like it had been hit with an ice pick, any fibre glass fairing gone. Now I maybe wrong on this part but the tail/empanage twisted.
Again memory could be wrong but Cessna didn’t write it off but rebuilt it, showing how tonka tough it was.
Now put a Cessna 210 into that same Thunderie…
The conquest pilot got into a situation he shouldn’t have been in and got away with it, a lesser built aircraft?
What’s my point?
But comparing the structural ability of a C210 to a C441 (single 300HP to a pressurised 1200+HP) is like comparing a Camry to a Sahara.
Note that Cessna soon after put a structural life on the C441 - grounding many (but you can get an EO to get around that!)
P.S Cessna stopped production of the Conquest in 1986 the same year they stopped the C210 production
Only 1 Sheety would have done that repair - lucky he was in Darwin & Cessna knew him well.
Last edited by Bend alot; 30th Dec 2022 at 12:37. Reason: Johnny
I never saw that 441 but heard about it and Gary was indeed a great person and operator - 2 classes above any other.
But comparing the structural ability of a C210 to a C441 (single 300HP to a pressurised 1200+HP) is like comparing a Camry to a Sahara.
Note that Cessna soon after put a structural life on the C441 - grounding many (but you can get an EO to get around that!)
P.S Cessna stopped production of the Conquest in 1986 the same year they stopped the C210 production
But comparing the structural ability of a C210 to a C441 (single 300HP to a pressurised 1200+HP) is like comparing a Camry to a Sahara.
Note that Cessna soon after put a structural life on the C441 - grounding many (but you can get an EO to get around that!)
P.S Cessna stopped production of the Conquest in 1986 the same year they stopped the C210 production
It doesn’t get more factual than what happened to that aircraft.
The point was if nature can do that to a conquest, imagine being in a similar position in a smaller aircraft, in this case a 210. Maybe I should have just compared that last 210 just out of Darwin but the point I was trying to make seems lost on some.
Ducky,
Not sure what rubbish you are referring to?
The conquest got bent in a thunderie, fact. Ok yes there is a hell of a lot more to that incident but I didn’t see the point in going deeper. The point was to really show what can happen.
The operator was a great operator, as I stated.
I obviously hit a nerve so apologies if you’ve taken what I meant the wrong way, certainly not my intention.
There is also another sad crash with a wing off an Aerostar, now if the foggy memory is correct it was around this time of year. Can’t remember the details behind that one.
Now thinking about it, was there a 210 between Kununurru and Darwin a few years back?
The point is weather can be dangerous and well.
If just one post on here helps a newbie or an experienced hand then it’s a post worth posting.
Not sure what rubbish you are referring to?
The conquest got bent in a thunderie, fact. Ok yes there is a hell of a lot more to that incident but I didn’t see the point in going deeper. The point was to really show what can happen.
The operator was a great operator, as I stated.
I obviously hit a nerve so apologies if you’ve taken what I meant the wrong way, certainly not my intention.
There is also another sad crash with a wing off an Aerostar, now if the foggy memory is correct it was around this time of year. Can’t remember the details behind that one.
Now thinking about it, was there a 210 between Kununurru and Darwin a few years back?
The point is weather can be dangerous and well.
If just one post on here helps a newbie or an experienced hand then it’s a post worth posting.
Come on moderators, lift your game!
A lot of the rubbish that’s being posted here is absolutely inappropriate discussion at this time - Absolutely disgraceful!
Time some of you old timers get off the keyboard and reminisce elsewhere.
My phone number hasn’t changed JT, call me to discuss further if you don’t agree😀😀😀😀😀
Cheers,
Craig
A lot of the rubbish that’s being posted here is absolutely inappropriate discussion at this time - Absolutely disgraceful!
Time some of you old timers get off the keyboard and reminisce elsewhere.
My phone number hasn’t changed JT, call me to discuss further if you don’t agree😀😀😀😀😀
Cheers,
Craig
Listen to everyone, you will learn something from the biggest of fools.
Personally I saw nothing constructive in your post (as you seem to see in many here) - Why not just call JT and tell him to shut it down?
Or would that be disgraceful behaviour?
Personally I think rumours should be allowed regard operator, rego, pilot skills, paxs background - but the Mods have been working on that it seems as no longer permitted till in MSM (that I hate).
Enough waffle from me - Mods please lift your game and delete my post.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/2022/a...craft-accident
with a debris field scattered over a large distance
Thread Starter
Let’s just leave the investigation to the authorities and stop speculating.
Some good discussion here, although I don’t feel it’s appropriate at this time.
Enough said from me, fly safe and have a happy new year.
Some good discussion here, although I don’t feel it’s appropriate at this time.
Enough said from me, fly safe and have a happy new year.
The following users liked this post:
Certainly look forward to seeing the preliminary report.
How deeply will operator culture be looked into?
Time will tell.
How deeply will operator culture be looked into?
Time will tell.
The following users liked this post:
If it turns out not to be that, then so be it. As long as the talk is respectful and doesn’t lay blame, it’s fair. There will always be family members reading these posts, and that can be both a negative and a positive thing.
Hopefully the report goes much deeper then just the factual basics of how the accident has happened.
Interviews with current pilots at KA to gauge the support and ability for the pilot to say no.
Interviews with instructors and students of the flight school to determine if appropriate things are being taught about Turbulence and Speed.
If any young fellas have videos of TFT doing beat ups or other questionable manoeuvres I hope they’re sent to the ATSB (even anonymously). If this sort of thing has occurred (I’m not saying it has) and it’s in the report maybe it’ll remind young pilots what can/could occur to an airframe for a future pilot.
Interviews with current pilots at KA to gauge the support and ability for the pilot to say no.
Interviews with instructors and students of the flight school to determine if appropriate things are being taught about Turbulence and Speed.
If any young fellas have videos of TFT doing beat ups or other questionable manoeuvres I hope they’re sent to the ATSB (even anonymously). If this sort of thing has occurred (I’m not saying it has) and it’s in the report maybe it’ll remind young pilots what can/could occur to an airframe for a future pilot.
Moderator
Good to see the thread generating a lot of interest.
A few comments, though.
Please keep in mind that all the mods are volunteer, part-time, itinerant folk who drop in when they can, and have the time. It is reasonable to expect some delays between any consecutive input from any given mod.
Unless I get overruled by those further up the food chain, my only request is that we don't identify people until that information is in the public domain media. There is no benefit to be had causing those left behind more grief and anguish than they already find themselves having to cope with. If necessary, mods can wield the big stick but I would hope that that is not necessary. On the other hand, robust discussion about this and that, in general, is a good thing and just might add to the body of general pilot knowledge which, often, can be seen to be lacking. Such discussion may have no direct relevance to this particular mishap but can contribute usefully to the general learning process. Indeed, some folk who push a particular wheelbarrow might well find themselves in a situation of embarrassment when the investigators' report(s) see the light of day.
As a mod, it is not my role to exercise an omnipotent guiding hand to the discussion and that, probably, would be a bit above both my paygrade and capability. All I am here to do is keep things reasonably cool, calm and collected. I might well disagree with comments I read but, again, that is not the point. However, I will keep things from getting too far out of hand regarding social propriety.
What really concerns me reading some of these posts is the simplistic expectations which some of our colleagues have about the aircraft they fly.
The reality is that an aircraft is designed on the basis of a load spectrum, turbulence spectrum, gust spectrum and so on with consideration of whatever design standard is relevant to the certification. There is no sensible basis for any presumption that one aircraft is as strong as another - on the one hand, put a specific aircraft in a situation where the external environment (eg thunderstorms) and/or pilot loadings (ie cowboys) are well outside the design envelope and it is going to go "bang". Further, if there is hidden fatigue damage, the "bang" trigger may be lower for some older aircraft. The tragic situation here is that the poor driver who gets killed usually isn't the cowboy who contributed to setting him up for the inflight disintegration.
However, where one aircraft will fail in a given set of circumstances, another might well survive. It is not a case of one story fits all circumstances. All the pilot can do to help things is to operate the aircraft sensibly and in line with what the OEM suggests in the POH/AFM.
The basic story is along the following lines and, if it seems that I am repeating myself, my apologies -
When the aircraft is new and released to service there is a high probability that it will survive fine if it is flown within the design expectations.
If the aircraft is
(a) overloaded modestly (ie much beyond the limit loads) for more than a few seconds, one shouldn't be surprised if things start to creak and groan, the odd bit bends and stays bent, rivets deform and pull out and so on.
(b) overloaded excessively (ie much beyond the ultimate loads - normally 150% of the limit loads) for more than a few seconds, one shouldn't be surprised if important things go "bang". If you haven't watched the Boeing video I linked to earlier, you should - it is quite illustrative of this part of the story.
Now, it is not a case of sudden cliffs (unless you fly straight into one - I recall a presentation where an impressive cliff, complete with an impressive big black smudge, indicated the last moments of, as I recall, a B1B) where, should you let your toe go beyond the edge you will die - there will be a little bit of fat as a result of the realities of the design process. However, as you can see with the Boeing video, that pad might not be more than a poofteenth or two. You certainly wouldn't stake your neck on unrealistic pilot expectations of what the aircraft might, or might not, do in reality. This stuff has a healthy serve of statistical expectation embodied so there will be a degree of rubbery-ness involved. Generally, the certification margins will cover that problem sufficient to let us sleep at night.
(c) oversped then the loading effects of turbulence and gusts are amplified and things could go pear-shaped very quickly. Should you fancy playing the hero above Vne by any significant margin, you run the risk of having the tin bits enter a dance competition mode - but just for a short period, often measured in split seconds - prior to becoming airborne Christmas tinsel.
Then you have the problems associated with operational history, especially structural fatigue. If the designer gets it right, the pilots do it right, and the maintainers do all their bits right, things should go along reasonably fine. This presumes, though, that the loading spectrum during that history is consistent with what the designer worked on. This is where the operators and the pilots, particularly, can make it a do or die outcome. The engineering world can go so far, but if we don't know what the aircraft has been "really" doing, then the sums get further and further away from reality and the continuing airworthiness expectations might not be able to achieve their intended aims.
When it comes to investigating a structural failure, the boffins can measure a lot of stuff and make a range of assessments. So, for instance, blind Freddy can see and assess a fatigue failure or a simple overload failure. What they might not be able to do is figure out the precise sequence of events on all occasions. So the idea of being able to know all the ins and outs of a structural failure might be a little optimistic.
What the pilot needs to make sure, is that he/she operates the aircraft in a manner consistent with the OEM's reasonable service history expectations. This means that we spend the very great majority of our time not too far away from 1g within a speed range which doesn't see us too much past Vc. It is presumed that there will be events which take the aircraft further into the depths of the VG envelope but, the further you get away from the routine operational presumption, the less and less frequent should be those excursions. If an aircraft is operated routinely in more turbulent conditions than the OEM expected or if the pilot pulls more g more often than the OEM expected, then the fatigue problems, especially, can escalate rapidly.
Fatigue can be thought of as a bucket full of aircraft structural life. Every time the aircraft moves into the higher g regions of the envelope, think in terms that you have just thrown an eggcup full of structural life out of the bucket. Eventually the bucket gets to be empty. Once you are in that region, it might only take a slight bump to set a static failure in motion and you might see the wings, or some other important bits, go "bang'. To suggest that ageing aircraft don't, occasionally, fail is silly - they do. However, if everyone has done their bit, appropriately, they shouldn't.
It's not all that difficult at the piloting level. If everyone does their bit and treats the aircraft with a bit of tenderness, we all have an increased probability of living another day ....
So far as the 210 is concerned, I've flown several models (although long ago) and found them a great little machine. However, as with any aircraft I strap to my tail, I do a bit of research into the TCDS and AFM to get a handle on what the OEM expects of me, as the pilot. You should do the same. If I'm in a normal category machine, I will have one set of OEM expectations, if in an acrobatic category machine, a whole different set of expectations. If I look at several normal category machines, they won't all embody the same set of expectations but, providing one knows the story adequate for operations, all should be well.
The worry is when folk don't give it any thought, just jump in and do whatever they think might be a fun thing ...
A few comments, though.
Please keep in mind that all the mods are volunteer, part-time, itinerant folk who drop in when they can, and have the time. It is reasonable to expect some delays between any consecutive input from any given mod.
Unless I get overruled by those further up the food chain, my only request is that we don't identify people until that information is in the public domain media. There is no benefit to be had causing those left behind more grief and anguish than they already find themselves having to cope with. If necessary, mods can wield the big stick but I would hope that that is not necessary. On the other hand, robust discussion about this and that, in general, is a good thing and just might add to the body of general pilot knowledge which, often, can be seen to be lacking. Such discussion may have no direct relevance to this particular mishap but can contribute usefully to the general learning process. Indeed, some folk who push a particular wheelbarrow might well find themselves in a situation of embarrassment when the investigators' report(s) see the light of day.
As a mod, it is not my role to exercise an omnipotent guiding hand to the discussion and that, probably, would be a bit above both my paygrade and capability. All I am here to do is keep things reasonably cool, calm and collected. I might well disagree with comments I read but, again, that is not the point. However, I will keep things from getting too far out of hand regarding social propriety.
What really concerns me reading some of these posts is the simplistic expectations which some of our colleagues have about the aircraft they fly.
The reality is that an aircraft is designed on the basis of a load spectrum, turbulence spectrum, gust spectrum and so on with consideration of whatever design standard is relevant to the certification. There is no sensible basis for any presumption that one aircraft is as strong as another - on the one hand, put a specific aircraft in a situation where the external environment (eg thunderstorms) and/or pilot loadings (ie cowboys) are well outside the design envelope and it is going to go "bang". Further, if there is hidden fatigue damage, the "bang" trigger may be lower for some older aircraft. The tragic situation here is that the poor driver who gets killed usually isn't the cowboy who contributed to setting him up for the inflight disintegration.
However, where one aircraft will fail in a given set of circumstances, another might well survive. It is not a case of one story fits all circumstances. All the pilot can do to help things is to operate the aircraft sensibly and in line with what the OEM suggests in the POH/AFM.
The basic story is along the following lines and, if it seems that I am repeating myself, my apologies -
When the aircraft is new and released to service there is a high probability that it will survive fine if it is flown within the design expectations.
If the aircraft is
(a) overloaded modestly (ie much beyond the limit loads) for more than a few seconds, one shouldn't be surprised if things start to creak and groan, the odd bit bends and stays bent, rivets deform and pull out and so on.
(b) overloaded excessively (ie much beyond the ultimate loads - normally 150% of the limit loads) for more than a few seconds, one shouldn't be surprised if important things go "bang". If you haven't watched the Boeing video I linked to earlier, you should - it is quite illustrative of this part of the story.
Now, it is not a case of sudden cliffs (unless you fly straight into one - I recall a presentation where an impressive cliff, complete with an impressive big black smudge, indicated the last moments of, as I recall, a B1B) where, should you let your toe go beyond the edge you will die - there will be a little bit of fat as a result of the realities of the design process. However, as you can see with the Boeing video, that pad might not be more than a poofteenth or two. You certainly wouldn't stake your neck on unrealistic pilot expectations of what the aircraft might, or might not, do in reality. This stuff has a healthy serve of statistical expectation embodied so there will be a degree of rubbery-ness involved. Generally, the certification margins will cover that problem sufficient to let us sleep at night.
(c) oversped then the loading effects of turbulence and gusts are amplified and things could go pear-shaped very quickly. Should you fancy playing the hero above Vne by any significant margin, you run the risk of having the tin bits enter a dance competition mode - but just for a short period, often measured in split seconds - prior to becoming airborne Christmas tinsel.
Then you have the problems associated with operational history, especially structural fatigue. If the designer gets it right, the pilots do it right, and the maintainers do all their bits right, things should go along reasonably fine. This presumes, though, that the loading spectrum during that history is consistent with what the designer worked on. This is where the operators and the pilots, particularly, can make it a do or die outcome. The engineering world can go so far, but if we don't know what the aircraft has been "really" doing, then the sums get further and further away from reality and the continuing airworthiness expectations might not be able to achieve their intended aims.
When it comes to investigating a structural failure, the boffins can measure a lot of stuff and make a range of assessments. So, for instance, blind Freddy can see and assess a fatigue failure or a simple overload failure. What they might not be able to do is figure out the precise sequence of events on all occasions. So the idea of being able to know all the ins and outs of a structural failure might be a little optimistic.
What the pilot needs to make sure, is that he/she operates the aircraft in a manner consistent with the OEM's reasonable service history expectations. This means that we spend the very great majority of our time not too far away from 1g within a speed range which doesn't see us too much past Vc. It is presumed that there will be events which take the aircraft further into the depths of the VG envelope but, the further you get away from the routine operational presumption, the less and less frequent should be those excursions. If an aircraft is operated routinely in more turbulent conditions than the OEM expected or if the pilot pulls more g more often than the OEM expected, then the fatigue problems, especially, can escalate rapidly.
Fatigue can be thought of as a bucket full of aircraft structural life. Every time the aircraft moves into the higher g regions of the envelope, think in terms that you have just thrown an eggcup full of structural life out of the bucket. Eventually the bucket gets to be empty. Once you are in that region, it might only take a slight bump to set a static failure in motion and you might see the wings, or some other important bits, go "bang'. To suggest that ageing aircraft don't, occasionally, fail is silly - they do. However, if everyone has done their bit, appropriately, they shouldn't.
It's not all that difficult at the piloting level. If everyone does their bit and treats the aircraft with a bit of tenderness, we all have an increased probability of living another day ....
So far as the 210 is concerned, I've flown several models (although long ago) and found them a great little machine. However, as with any aircraft I strap to my tail, I do a bit of research into the TCDS and AFM to get a handle on what the OEM expects of me, as the pilot. You should do the same. If I'm in a normal category machine, I will have one set of OEM expectations, if in an acrobatic category machine, a whole different set of expectations. If I look at several normal category machines, they won't all embody the same set of expectations but, providing one knows the story adequate for operations, all should be well.
The worry is when folk don't give it any thought, just jump in and do whatever they think might be a fun thing ...
The following 7 users liked this post by john_tullamarine:
How deeply will operator culture be looked into?
From what I hear, they instead only guarantee pay for 15 hours a week, no casual loading, but expect pilots to be on standby unpaid the rest of the time. The only way to get paid more than that is to fly, regardless of the weather, regardless of any other factors. Pay by the NM would encourage pilots to divert around weather, but instead they make pilots explain themselves for any discrepancy if a flight takes more than 0.1 longer than their spreadsheet says.
Is LG back from his holidays yet?
Is LG back from his holidays yet?