Boeing pilot involved in Max testing is indicted in Texas
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Especially after the unseemly - and unlawful (imho) - manipulation of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement process to exclude the crash victims' families in the Texas criminal case against Boeing, the efforts to hoist Mr. Forkner to twist in the wind look even more outrageous. As if the deliberate deceit after Lion Air wasn't bad enough....(and all the other things on all the other levels in which the company acted wrongly).
Even Dennis Muilenburg didn't give me the impression of being happy with the take it or get fired targets he got from the shareholders and the financial stakeholders around them. Knowing, very well, that Boeing financial road would be disastrous for Boeing's long-term future. But hey, it's a good salary, good social standing, and if they want it, I'll do so.
"just to move the blame away from the company"
The company accepted full blame. What Boeing doesn't want is to have 20,000 relatives of relatives of relatives coming up with reasons they should have been considered and dragging the proceeding out for a decade.
"the deliberate deceit after Lion Air"
Source for that?
How does it compare with "They followed the procedure exactly" a year before issuing a report that showed they did not follow even a single step (because steps are order dependent) correctly?
This is what runaway stabilizer presents as on the Classic - prior to the NG - prior to the MAX - that's how old this procedure is and how training is supposed to be. Note the startling warning horn.
The company accepted full blame. What Boeing doesn't want is to have 20,000 relatives of relatives of relatives coming up with reasons they should have been considered and dragging the proceeding out for a decade.
"the deliberate deceit after Lion Air"
Source for that?
How does it compare with "They followed the procedure exactly" a year before issuing a report that showed they did not follow even a single step (because steps are order dependent) correctly?
This is what runaway stabilizer presents as on the Classic - prior to the NG - prior to the MAX - that's how old this procedure is and how training is supposed to be. Note the startling warning horn.
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Source? for Boeing shafting the public after Lion Air? I'll assume the question is not meant as just sarcasm. . . . although I'm only citing one of several reports or court filings listing and documenting the misdeeds between Crash 1 and Crash 2.
See the court filing, "Statement by Naoise Connolly Ryan, et al., Regarding Court-Imposed Conditions of Release of Boeing Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142, filed in the criminal case in federal court in Texas. On Pacer.gov, it's easily found, case 4:21-cr-00005-O, Doc. 170, filed Jan. 25, 2023, especially pages of the filing 11-14. The court filing cites sources for substantially if not literally all the statements attributed to Boeing or its corporate officers. Though the context is advocacy to right the wrong caused by exclusion of the crash victims' families from consideration of the DPA, the filing does a neat job of collecting facts and sources. Check it out.
(Just quite briefly, I'm not trying here to dispute assertions about wrong-doing by the Ethiopian entities involved - but even if all true, none of it excuses the way the company dealt with the Lion AIir crash. Perhaps that's not your view, or perhaps it is but the logic is beyond my understanding.)
See the court filing, "Statement by Naoise Connolly Ryan, et al., Regarding Court-Imposed Conditions of Release of Boeing Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142, filed in the criminal case in federal court in Texas. On Pacer.gov, it's easily found, case 4:21-cr-00005-O, Doc. 170, filed Jan. 25, 2023, especially pages of the filing 11-14. The court filing cites sources for substantially if not literally all the statements attributed to Boeing or its corporate officers. Though the context is advocacy to right the wrong caused by exclusion of the crash victims' families from consideration of the DPA, the filing does a neat job of collecting facts and sources. Check it out.
(Just quite briefly, I'm not trying here to dispute assertions about wrong-doing by the Ethiopian entities involved - but even if all true, none of it excuses the way the company dealt with the Lion AIir crash. Perhaps that's not your view, or perhaps it is but the logic is beyond my understanding.)
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Here it is, no paywall - https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-co...fort-worth.pdf
To be fair, you must not have watched the video of how trim runaway is a #1 priority for control and how easily it is managed. Because of that you didn't see that pulling the plug on the autopilot and the autothrottle were nearly reflex actions, with both pilots ensuring the throttle was set correctly with actual hands on actual levers.
What you also didn't see in the Ethiopian reports was any hint Ethiopian took even one dollar and spent it on a refresher in the simulator in response to the emergency AD.
Win-win. If they crash they get a discount and Tigray is removed from the headlines. If they don't crash they saved a few training dollars.
How a fully documented event as occurred to the Lion Air 2nd crew can be considered a "cover-up" is beyond me. Every scrap of the necessary information was in the report and every response required was in the Emergency AD.
There are a lot of things in that section of the filing they hope are relevant, but hope does not evidence or truth create.
The reason for not concentrating on AoA sensor failure is that there could be other failures that produced the same symptoms. Deal with the symptom and let the maintainers determine the cause, don't give pilots a diagnostic chart for equipment they cannot repair. There was no control rendered inoperative by MCAS, except MCAS. In contrast, the failure of the AoA system disabled the autopilot and the autothrottle - the same as has happened to Airbus at least twice. They lucked into hero pilots somehow.
Boeing knew as much as everyone about it after the preliminary report - no airline took the planes out of service, no CAA questioned the Emergency AD or the FCOM update. It must be quite a shock that engineers looking at how the trim runaway is to be managed would not expect a crew doing every wrong action possible as the ET-302 crew did. A winding cliff-side road, a low tire - push the gas pedal to the floor and yank the wheel as hard towards the precipice as possible. Even Lion Air was going OK as long as the captain was in charge - he retrimmed 20 times before letting the FO have at it.
"Boeing’s internal Safety Review Board had identified an ongoing “airplane safety issue” " There is a reason the lawyers didn't mention in the complaint what that issue was. Is it because it had nothing to do with the two crash causes?
And here is the lawyer lie:
In fact what Forkner described is not what happened to Lion Air or Ethiopian Air. This is simply a false narrative. No question at all. Not even close. The lawyer, Ted Cruz, knows it or should know it. It fails due diligence by a mile. I missed where the "crazy" reference was plucked from; that may just be laziness to fail to include it.
Any mention of Cruz is marred as an unreliable narrator, but it helps to sway the judiciary to have a state senator on your side.
The fact is this lie was repeated as evidence in the complaint. Another failure of due diligence.
Before one claims it was a simple mistake - aren't lawyers supposed to be sure of their facts? Is Ted Cruz that incompetent in spite of being known as one of the best prepared lawyers in every setting it has come up? Nope - Ted isn't incompetent. He is hoping that J. Q. Public will believe what he said. Perhaps he was riding the wave of indignation or perhaps the Boeing lobbyists didn't produce a sufficient offering. But what of that slate of lawyers? Are all of them that incompetent or are they too hoping what they wrote will simply be accepted as fact?
So the evidence MCAS was hidden is based on unsubstantiated claims by attorneys who fail to perform due diligence before repeating a lie as evidence?
I get it - it's the impassioned speech one prepares when the facts are weak. After Lion Air the entire industry accepted the preliminary report explaining how it worked and the Emergency AD and FCOM updates were issued as the solution - the same solution that had already been used and proven the day before the Lion Air crash. It was acceptable to all parties: no CAAs demanded the plane be grounded, no airlines walked away, no pilots quit for safety concerns, no pilots apparently sweating like being ushered to the electric chair as they took their seats. And no one went into a simulator to prove it would or would not work.
No one was concerned about the information until Ethiopian crashed and an entirely fictitious story about how it was handled was fabricated.
Because - Win-Win.
aren't all facts. Many are speculation, some are outright lies.
To be fair, you must not have watched the video of how trim runaway is a #1 priority for control and how easily it is managed. Because of that you didn't see that pulling the plug on the autopilot and the autothrottle were nearly reflex actions, with both pilots ensuring the throttle was set correctly with actual hands on actual levers.
What you also didn't see in the Ethiopian reports was any hint Ethiopian took even one dollar and spent it on a refresher in the simulator in response to the emergency AD.
Win-win. If they crash they get a discount and Tigray is removed from the headlines. If they don't crash they saved a few training dollars.
How a fully documented event as occurred to the Lion Air 2nd crew can be considered a "cover-up" is beyond me. Every scrap of the necessary information was in the report and every response required was in the Emergency AD.
There are a lot of things in that section of the filing they hope are relevant, but hope does not evidence or truth create.
The reason for not concentrating on AoA sensor failure is that there could be other failures that produced the same symptoms. Deal with the symptom and let the maintainers determine the cause, don't give pilots a diagnostic chart for equipment they cannot repair. There was no control rendered inoperative by MCAS, except MCAS. In contrast, the failure of the AoA system disabled the autopilot and the autothrottle - the same as has happened to Airbus at least twice. They lucked into hero pilots somehow.
Boeing knew as much as everyone about it after the preliminary report - no airline took the planes out of service, no CAA questioned the Emergency AD or the FCOM update. It must be quite a shock that engineers looking at how the trim runaway is to be managed would not expect a crew doing every wrong action possible as the ET-302 crew did. A winding cliff-side road, a low tire - push the gas pedal to the floor and yank the wheel as hard towards the precipice as possible. Even Lion Air was going OK as long as the captain was in charge - he retrimmed 20 times before letting the FO have at it.
"Boeing’s internal Safety Review Board had identified an ongoing “airplane safety issue” " There is a reason the lawyers didn't mention in the complaint what that issue was. Is it because it had nothing to do with the two crash causes?
And here is the lawyer lie:
Mr. Forkner: [...] MCAS is now active down to M .2. It's running rampant in the sim on me
Mr. Gustavsson: Oh great, that means we have to update the speed trim description in vol 2
Mr. Forkner: so I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly) [...] granted, I suck at flying, but even this was egregious/
That exchange describes what happened in Lion Air and Ethiopian Air.
The men and women who are gathered here with the photos of your loved ones—
346 people are dead because [of] what these chief pilots described as ‘egregious'
and ‘crazy' - that's their language. That’s Boeing's internal language in this
exchange.
Mr. Gustavsson: Oh great, that means we have to update the speed trim description in vol 2
Mr. Forkner: so I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly) [...] granted, I suck at flying, but even this was egregious/
That exchange describes what happened in Lion Air and Ethiopian Air.
The men and women who are gathered here with the photos of your loved ones—
346 people are dead because [of] what these chief pilots described as ‘egregious'
and ‘crazy' - that's their language. That’s Boeing's internal language in this
exchange.
Any mention of Cruz is marred as an unreliable narrator, but it helps to sway the judiciary to have a state senator on your side.
The fact is this lie was repeated as evidence in the complaint. Another failure of due diligence.
Before one claims it was a simple mistake - aren't lawyers supposed to be sure of their facts? Is Ted Cruz that incompetent in spite of being known as one of the best prepared lawyers in every setting it has come up? Nope - Ted isn't incompetent. He is hoping that J. Q. Public will believe what he said. Perhaps he was riding the wave of indignation or perhaps the Boeing lobbyists didn't produce a sufficient offering. But what of that slate of lawyers? Are all of them that incompetent or are they too hoping what they wrote will simply be accepted as fact?
The real reason that Boeing declined to answer the questions about MCAS is that truthful answers would have revealed that additional pilot training was required for pilots transitioning to the 737 MAX
I get it - it's the impassioned speech one prepares when the facts are weak. After Lion Air the entire industry accepted the preliminary report explaining how it worked and the Emergency AD and FCOM updates were issued as the solution - the same solution that had already been used and proven the day before the Lion Air crash. It was acceptable to all parties: no CAAs demanded the plane be grounded, no airlines walked away, no pilots quit for safety concerns, no pilots apparently sweating like being ushered to the electric chair as they took their seats. And no one went into a simulator to prove it would or would not work.
No one was concerned about the information until Ethiopian crashed and an entirely fictitious story about how it was handled was fabricated.
Because - Win-Win.
The above-recounted facts
What precise punishments are suitable WideScreen? Others have been as vaguely adamant about that and refuse to comment on their desired outcome.
Care to take a swing at the effigy?
Care to take a swing at the effigy?
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And a subgoal for the US society as a whole, it becomes clear, that these large scale lies are not covered by whatever amendment, and that even applies to Trump, the master himself, in this area.
The same for Boeing, get all the lying into the public domain, in court, up to a level, that it becomes clear, this whole setup at Boeing was intentionally. At which point you might get the evidence for manslaughter charges to the individual managers.
The moment that happens, the next generation managers at whatever company will become very careful to intentionally create an environment that can derail, like what has happened at Boeing. With such an approach, something useful is created for society.
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Maybe I'm misreading or misunderstanding your post.
Punishment, attribution, cause; or understanding from which to learn.
If we start with a viewpoint of the first three, then a person can be identified. The old view of safety, a natural self satisfying human reaction, often the basis of litigious judgement. Has been useful in improving safety, but only so far.
Alternatively seeking understanding, particularly in complex systems can provide insight to improve the processes of design, certification, and operations. Need for more systems thinking in very safe operations.
The real world is never a clear cut one or other extreme, thus it is important to consider our viewpoints, where are we starting from, our assumptions, what do we wish to find, how we frame our thoughts.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
If we start with a viewpoint of the first three, then a person can be identified. The old view of safety, a natural self satisfying human reaction, often the basis of litigious judgement. Has been useful in improving safety, but only so far.
Alternatively seeking understanding, particularly in complex systems can provide insight to improve the processes of design, certification, and operations. Need for more systems thinking in very safe operations.
The real world is never a clear cut one or other extreme, thus it is important to consider our viewpoints, where are we starting from, our assumptions, what do we wish to find, how we frame our thoughts.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
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So, MechEngr, I'm laboring to stay concise, inasmuch as I feel like we've landed in "Cool Hand Luke" (1967): ["What we have here, is a failure to communicate.'"]
First, the court filing I referenced (and thank you for linking it) was prepared and filed by Paul Cassell, lead counsel for the crash victims' families in the federal court criminal case in Texas. Mr. Cassell is a law professor at the University of Utah in addition to his representation of clients. Other counsel are listed as well. There is no mention, none whatsover, anywhere in the filing, of the junior United States Senator from Texas, Senator Ted Cruz [edit: as an author of the court filing].. True, he filed a friend-of-the-court brief in the case, but to bring up his name in the particular context of the court filing I referenced .... I have to say, whatever substantive point sought to be communicated has not reached my comprehension.
Second, the training video. For openers, watching it is one thing, comprehending pilot reflexes (your term) is something not allowed for SLFs absent unique experience and qualifications, which I most certainly have not claimed to have (here, or anywhere else). As you note, the simulator is for a pre-737 MAX variant - would that not call into question its relevance for assessing anything about the MAX or MCAS, including but not limited to the two accidents? Also, one wonders what to think about the disclaimer on the video, "not for training purposes" - is it somehow below standards?
(So, yes, I had watched part of it before, and more of it now, but what exactly it is supposed to prove about the issues being discussed here .... not clear.)
Third, you wrote, "Every scrap of the required information was in the report and every response requested was in the emergency AD." You also wrote, "Boeing knew as much as everyone about it after the preliminary report - no airline took the planes out off service, no CAA questioned the emergency AD or the FCOM update."
After the NYT Magazine published an article written by William Langewiesche (Sept. 2019), this SLF/attorney asserted some similar notions about the evident mishandling, by the Ethiopian pilots, of the situation presented to them, on a twitter thread run by an independent aviation journalist and blogger (who doesn't deserve to have his name or publication dragged into this thread). Of course I only could parrot, or try to summarize, what the NYT article had claimed - not interpret things from a pilot's knowledge base. And did I ever get "ratio'd"!! Attacked for having "blamed the pilots", I kind of swore off making assertions of that nature a second time.
Which of course does not constrain anyone else. But what is the point sought to be established? Let it be assumed that the unfortunate souls who perished in the Ethiopian crash lost their lives due to the causes you have asserted. What does that prove about the 737 MAX debacle overall? So, all the information needed for that flight crew to save the day was available - how does that help Boeing out of the overall problem it created for itself? And if I didn't know better, I could miscontrue the second sentence quoted above, about the absence of airline and CAA actions and objections to the emergency AD, as a claim that the entire 737 MAX debacle has been nothing but an overreaction to the successful hoodwinking by Ethiopian entities to achieve what you call a "win-win." Surely you don't mean that, in other words that all the reports, in House of Representatives, by specially appointed panels at DOT, by the Inspector General, and more, really weren't about anythinig material, weren't necessary, because Ethiopia set out for a win-win. Yet that is how your advocacy, to be blunt, appears to play among the larger audience, as near as I can tell.
And speaking of that country and its motives - and leaving to one side the interesting question, what special insight or sourcing do you have for Ethiopia, or is it just keen powers of observation and logic being applied - you're asking the world (or the fraction of it that digs into threads here) to believe that the "discount" was a sufficiently concrete and material factor for the government to play air-crash roulette? I think, probably, something more definite in the way of proof (not merely what media types invoke as "evidence") would be needed. Perhaps there is a great deal of proof available (?)
Almost last, you wrote about thousands upon thousands of three levels of crash victims' relatives. Is there even a single case in any air crash disaster in which such levels of claimants have been before the court, let alone compensated? Maybe that was just colorful advocacy - but if there are examples, it would be nice to add to one's knowledge.
And finally, the point I raised was that after Lion AIr, the statements - for example, what the CEO told the Wall Street Journal - were purposefully deceitful. I've said it before and one more time, with lack of feeling: even if the "win-win" scheme, or call it a conspiracy or plot or calculation, happened as you assert, what "if anything" does that prove about: (a) false and misleading statements by Boeing after the Lion Air crash, and (b) the overall 737 MAX debacle?
First, the court filing I referenced (and thank you for linking it) was prepared and filed by Paul Cassell, lead counsel for the crash victims' families in the federal court criminal case in Texas. Mr. Cassell is a law professor at the University of Utah in addition to his representation of clients. Other counsel are listed as well. There is no mention, none whatsover, anywhere in the filing, of the junior United States Senator from Texas, Senator Ted Cruz [edit: as an author of the court filing].. True, he filed a friend-of-the-court brief in the case, but to bring up his name in the particular context of the court filing I referenced .... I have to say, whatever substantive point sought to be communicated has not reached my comprehension.
Second, the training video. For openers, watching it is one thing, comprehending pilot reflexes (your term) is something not allowed for SLFs absent unique experience and qualifications, which I most certainly have not claimed to have (here, or anywhere else). As you note, the simulator is for a pre-737 MAX variant - would that not call into question its relevance for assessing anything about the MAX or MCAS, including but not limited to the two accidents? Also, one wonders what to think about the disclaimer on the video, "not for training purposes" - is it somehow below standards?
(So, yes, I had watched part of it before, and more of it now, but what exactly it is supposed to prove about the issues being discussed here .... not clear.)
Third, you wrote, "Every scrap of the required information was in the report and every response requested was in the emergency AD." You also wrote, "Boeing knew as much as everyone about it after the preliminary report - no airline took the planes out off service, no CAA questioned the emergency AD or the FCOM update."
After the NYT Magazine published an article written by William Langewiesche (Sept. 2019), this SLF/attorney asserted some similar notions about the evident mishandling, by the Ethiopian pilots, of the situation presented to them, on a twitter thread run by an independent aviation journalist and blogger (who doesn't deserve to have his name or publication dragged into this thread). Of course I only could parrot, or try to summarize, what the NYT article had claimed - not interpret things from a pilot's knowledge base. And did I ever get "ratio'd"!! Attacked for having "blamed the pilots", I kind of swore off making assertions of that nature a second time.
Which of course does not constrain anyone else. But what is the point sought to be established? Let it be assumed that the unfortunate souls who perished in the Ethiopian crash lost their lives due to the causes you have asserted. What does that prove about the 737 MAX debacle overall? So, all the information needed for that flight crew to save the day was available - how does that help Boeing out of the overall problem it created for itself? And if I didn't know better, I could miscontrue the second sentence quoted above, about the absence of airline and CAA actions and objections to the emergency AD, as a claim that the entire 737 MAX debacle has been nothing but an overreaction to the successful hoodwinking by Ethiopian entities to achieve what you call a "win-win." Surely you don't mean that, in other words that all the reports, in House of Representatives, by specially appointed panels at DOT, by the Inspector General, and more, really weren't about anythinig material, weren't necessary, because Ethiopia set out for a win-win. Yet that is how your advocacy, to be blunt, appears to play among the larger audience, as near as I can tell.
And speaking of that country and its motives - and leaving to one side the interesting question, what special insight or sourcing do you have for Ethiopia, or is it just keen powers of observation and logic being applied - you're asking the world (or the fraction of it that digs into threads here) to believe that the "discount" was a sufficiently concrete and material factor for the government to play air-crash roulette? I think, probably, something more definite in the way of proof (not merely what media types invoke as "evidence") would be needed. Perhaps there is a great deal of proof available (?)
Almost last, you wrote about thousands upon thousands of three levels of crash victims' relatives. Is there even a single case in any air crash disaster in which such levels of claimants have been before the court, let alone compensated? Maybe that was just colorful advocacy - but if there are examples, it would be nice to add to one's knowledge.
And finally, the point I raised was that after Lion AIr, the statements - for example, what the CEO told the Wall Street Journal - were purposefully deceitful. I've said it before and one more time, with lack of feeling: even if the "win-win" scheme, or call it a conspiracy or plot or calculation, happened as you assert, what "if anything" does that prove about: (a) false and misleading statements by Boeing after the Lion Air crash, and (b) the overall 737 MAX debacle?
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 17th Apr 2023 at 22:09.
I depend on the logic of the situation - what a coldly rational evaluation of the situation was. Ethiopia made a business calculation. Just like they did to invade the Tigray region. Boeing, et al, did not foresee that a mass casualty event would be acceptable to a typical airline, but underestimated what invulnerability allows an actor to consider.
If Ethiopia had halted all MAX flights to retrain all their pilots for that brand new centerpiece acquisition, that would make their political position weaker and cost them for the retraining and loss of ticket sales. Skipping training was a positive. They knew that if the plane crashed from mishandling due to MCAS inputs that would be a bargaining position. Those considering a war against civilians certainly aren't concerned with a handful of passengers.
Why not proceed -- you claim "roulette," but there was no gambling at all as they controlled the house or, in this case, the narrative.
That pilot who did quit Ethiopian related a case where an engine was thought to be leaking fuel - a ramp worker reported a far larger than normal amount of fuel pooled under an engine. The pilot called for someone to check the engine, which would delay the flight. He reported he was told that a leak was not his concern - if the engine caught fire the airline would seek compensation from the engine maker.
That's the sort of calculation they would have made about MCAS. I don't currently believe they looked forward to a crash, I would say they did not care if it happened because the outcome was a benefit. For certain the Chief Pilot wasn't on that plane.
---
Perhaps I misread this section then (my bolding):
I posted what Ted Cruz went on to say in the earlier post.
---
is basic cover to prevent anyone half-remembering what was shown coming to sue them over some mishap. Very much like the YouTube lawyers who emphasize they are not to be taken as legal advice while they are pointing out laws and precedents that might apply to a case they are exploring. Even in engineering, particularly civil and structural (buildings and bridges,) engineers will emphasize that advice is as-is and must be compared to applicable regulations which can vary with locale.
---
I think this action is against the wrong party, but the correct party is invulnerable. Being "false and misleading" did not cause ET-302 to crash. Putting improperly trained people in control of an aircraft with a known, sometimes fatal but easily controllable, defect caused ET-302 to crash. Part of that improper training has been complacency over trim runaway containment training, but that was exactly what the communications from Boeing and the FAA stated was the problem.
If Ethiopia had halted all MAX flights to retrain all their pilots for that brand new centerpiece acquisition, that would make their political position weaker and cost them for the retraining and loss of ticket sales. Skipping training was a positive. They knew that if the plane crashed from mishandling due to MCAS inputs that would be a bargaining position. Those considering a war against civilians certainly aren't concerned with a handful of passengers.
Why not proceed -- you claim "roulette," but there was no gambling at all as they controlled the house or, in this case, the narrative.
That pilot who did quit Ethiopian related a case where an engine was thought to be leaking fuel - a ramp worker reported a far larger than normal amount of fuel pooled under an engine. The pilot called for someone to check the engine, which would delay the flight. He reported he was told that a leak was not his concern - if the engine caught fire the airline would seek compensation from the engine maker.
That's the sort of calculation they would have made about MCAS. I don't currently believe they looked forward to a crash, I would say they did not care if it happened because the outcome was a benefit. For certain the Chief Pilot wasn't on that plane.
---
Perhaps I misread this section then (my bolding):
Senator Ted Cruz has taken a leading role in exposing Boeing’s criminal behavior. During
investigative hearing on the two crashes, Senator Cruz exposed what Boeing had done through
pointed questions to CEO Muilenburg:
The testimony here today has been quite dismaying. I want to focus on the
text exchange that has been referred to and has been publicly reported on. There
was a text exchange between Mark Forkner, who was then Boeing’s technical
pilot for the MAX—chief technical pilot for the MAX—and Mr. Gustavsson, who
in 2018 was promoted to be Boeing's 737 chief technical pilot."
Mr. Forkner: [...] MCAS is now active down to M .2. It's running rampant in the sim on me
investigative hearing on the two crashes, Senator Cruz exposed what Boeing had done through
pointed questions to CEO Muilenburg:
The testimony here today has been quite dismaying. I want to focus on the
text exchange that has been referred to and has been publicly reported on. There
was a text exchange between Mark Forkner, who was then Boeing’s technical
pilot for the MAX—chief technical pilot for the MAX—and Mr. Gustavsson, who
in 2018 was promoted to be Boeing's 737 chief technical pilot."
Mr. Forkner: [...] MCAS is now active down to M .2. It's running rampant in the sim on me
---
"not for training purposes"
---
I think this action is against the wrong party, but the correct party is invulnerable. Being "false and misleading" did not cause ET-302 to crash. Putting improperly trained people in control of an aircraft with a known, sometimes fatal but easily controllable, defect caused ET-302 to crash. Part of that improper training has been complacency over trim runaway containment training, but that was exactly what the communications from Boeing and the FAA stated was the problem.
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I've never visited the country known as . . . .
(i) prior post seemed to argue Sen. Cruz was responsible for the court filing, as compared to arguing that Cruz's remarks as referenced in the filing, were incorrect. The misreading occurred on my end.
(ii) I anticipate your "wrong party" assertion would prompt lively discussion even from venerable defense counsel, not only the gun-slingers. That is, the manufacturer takes a given customer's host country's civil aviation sector as a whole as the manufacturer finds it.
(iii) it turns out, to some extent reading between lines, that your advocacy about "matters involving Ethiopia" (lacking a better phrase at this time) may not be intended to be read or interpreted as a broad exoneration of Boeing with regard to the entire set of 737 MAX debacles. As it happens, I detest the word "narrative" but I'll use it: ..... the part of the overall set of debacles with this aircraft which in your view must include and account for the narrative you relate about matters involving Ethiopia, that part of the overall debacles stands on its own. Not as a reason to minimize or even disengage from any other 737 MAX failing by Boeing that has come to light. (I hesitate to "buy" that narrative but I cannot refute it, either, so.....)
(Iv) nonetheless, having said all that, I think the record of Boeing's dishonesty after the Lion Air accident speaks adequately for itself. Boeing, which agreed to the DPA, wasn't charged with a crime relating to or involving its post-Lion Air acts and omissions. Perhaps your view is that corruption or similar malfeasance in the matters involving Ethiopia is so significant that the crash victims' families' legal offensive against the DPA should be thrown aside. But the statutory provisions in question, .... I'll just say, I would disagree.
Hey, thanks for waiving off snark and so on, & for tolerating some from my end.
(i) prior post seemed to argue Sen. Cruz was responsible for the court filing, as compared to arguing that Cruz's remarks as referenced in the filing, were incorrect. The misreading occurred on my end.
(ii) I anticipate your "wrong party" assertion would prompt lively discussion even from venerable defense counsel, not only the gun-slingers. That is, the manufacturer takes a given customer's host country's civil aviation sector as a whole as the manufacturer finds it.
(iii) it turns out, to some extent reading between lines, that your advocacy about "matters involving Ethiopia" (lacking a better phrase at this time) may not be intended to be read or interpreted as a broad exoneration of Boeing with regard to the entire set of 737 MAX debacles. As it happens, I detest the word "narrative" but I'll use it: ..... the part of the overall set of debacles with this aircraft which in your view must include and account for the narrative you relate about matters involving Ethiopia, that part of the overall debacles stands on its own. Not as a reason to minimize or even disengage from any other 737 MAX failing by Boeing that has come to light. (I hesitate to "buy" that narrative but I cannot refute it, either, so.....)
(Iv) nonetheless, having said all that, I think the record of Boeing's dishonesty after the Lion Air accident speaks adequately for itself. Boeing, which agreed to the DPA, wasn't charged with a crime relating to or involving its post-Lion Air acts and omissions. Perhaps your view is that corruption or similar malfeasance in the matters involving Ethiopia is so significant that the crash victims' families' legal offensive against the DPA should be thrown aside. But the statutory provisions in question, .... I'll just say, I would disagree.
Hey, thanks for waiving off snark and so on, & for tolerating some from my end.
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Let me elaborate.
When one wants (at engineering) to create the best results, going "beyond" the current state of technology, one needs to take care, the engineers working on this, do cooperate together. Not only inside a (small) group of engineers, working on a specific topic, though also among the groups of engineers, relevant for that topic.
The disadvantage of such an approach is, that engineers tend to "keep working" on solutions, without ever reaching a result, they are "happy" with (the nature of engineers, to create the best of the best). The effect of that is, that the time and money spend on the items at place, will be "unlimited". So, you need measures in place to keep a tab on this happening.
What Boeing did was compartmentalize the engineers in their own groups and let the communication between those groups go through managers. Very effective to keep the time and costs low, that works at the micro-level. Unfortunately, at Boeing, it shows all signs in what is being reported, the "gatekeeper" managers, just chopped off the engineer group interaction, before suitable engineered solutions were developed. So, immature solutions were brought into production and the final products. (More companies struggle with that: Philips respirators, for example).
So, intentionally, Boeing did create an engineering environment, aiming to keep the development costs/lead-time low, at the expense of an inferior product. From the Forkner messages and a lot of other leaked messages, it is clear, the engineers involved with the development did not support these limitations. Not to say, when being a major engineering company, one is responsible to set up an engineering environment that can create mature products, this is a major item for the companies top management (IE, "security is our first priority"). This is where Boeing top management just failed and followed their own goal, "profit above everything else". This change of the organization into a profit over security model, was a deliberate action.
Make top managers personally/criminally responsible for the fall-out of their intentional actions, which will derail the development of suitable secure products, and this whole "security is our first priority" theater will finally become a reality. I hope, it's clear now.
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Punishment, attribution, cause; or understanding from which to learn.
If we start with a viewpoint of the first three, then a person can be identified. The old view of safety, a natural self satisfying human reaction, often the basis of litigious judgement. Has been useful in improving safety, but only so far.
Alternatively seeking understanding, particularly in complex systems can provide insight to improve the processes of design, certification, and operations. Need for more systems thinking in very safe operations.
The real world is never a clear cut one or other extreme, thus it is important to consider our viewpoints, where are we starting from, our assumptions, what do we wish to find, how we frame our thoughts.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
If we start with a viewpoint of the first three, then a person can be identified. The old view of safety, a natural self satisfying human reaction, often the basis of litigious judgement. Has been useful in improving safety, but only so far.
Alternatively seeking understanding, particularly in complex systems can provide insight to improve the processes of design, certification, and operations. Need for more systems thinking in very safe operations.
The real world is never a clear cut one or other extreme, thus it is important to consider our viewpoints, where are we starting from, our assumptions, what do we wish to find, how we frame our thoughts.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail
If so, in principle, this sounds a good idea, though looking a little further into the Boeing case, I don't think, this MAX saga could be handled from a just-culture perspective. The reason for this is, the mishap was a deliberate top-management action, in violation with the fundamental principle "Security is our first priority" (all signs are there, including the "hiding"/"lying" towards FAA and customers). The MAX MCAS failure was not an engineering accident, its happening was build into the organization of Boeing engineering, the compartmentalization. Once an action is deliberate and warnings have been issued that the action will fail, a just-culture approach is past its goals: "Learn from one's honest mistakes" and it becomes criminal.
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I've never visited the country known as . . . .
(i) prior post seemed to argue Sen. Cruz was responsible for the court filing, as compared to arguing that Cruz's remarks as referenced in the filing, were incorrect. The misreading occurred on my end.
(ii) I anticipate your "wrong party" assertion would prompt lively discussion even from venerable defense counsel, not only the gun-slingers. That is, the manufacturer takes a given customer's host country's civil aviation sector as a whole as the manufacturer finds it.
(iii) it turns out, to some extent reading between lines, that your advocacy about "matters involving Ethiopia" (lacking a better phrase at this time) may not be intended to be read or interpreted as a broad exoneration of Boeing with regard to the entire set of 737 MAX debacles. As it happens, I detest the word "narrative" but I'll use it: ..... the part of the overall set of debacles with this aircraft which in your view must include and account for the narrative you relate about matters involving Ethiopia, that part of the overall debacles stands on its own. Not as a reason to minimize or even disengage from any other 737 MAX failing by Boeing that has come to light. (I hesitate to "buy" that narrative but I cannot refute it, either, so.....)
(Iv) nonetheless, having said all that, I think the record of Boeing's dishonesty after the Lion Air accident speaks adequately for itself. Boeing, which agreed to the DPA, wasn't charged with a crime relating to or involving its post-Lion Air acts and omissions. Perhaps your view is that corruption or similar malfeasance in the matters involving Ethiopia is so significant that the crash victims' families' legal offensive against the DPA should be thrown aside. But the statutory provisions in question, .... I'll just say, I would disagree.
Hey, thanks for waiving off snark and so on, & for tolerating some from my end.
(i) prior post seemed to argue Sen. Cruz was responsible for the court filing, as compared to arguing that Cruz's remarks as referenced in the filing, were incorrect. The misreading occurred on my end.
(ii) I anticipate your "wrong party" assertion would prompt lively discussion even from venerable defense counsel, not only the gun-slingers. That is, the manufacturer takes a given customer's host country's civil aviation sector as a whole as the manufacturer finds it.
(iii) it turns out, to some extent reading between lines, that your advocacy about "matters involving Ethiopia" (lacking a better phrase at this time) may not be intended to be read or interpreted as a broad exoneration of Boeing with regard to the entire set of 737 MAX debacles. As it happens, I detest the word "narrative" but I'll use it: ..... the part of the overall set of debacles with this aircraft which in your view must include and account for the narrative you relate about matters involving Ethiopia, that part of the overall debacles stands on its own. Not as a reason to minimize or even disengage from any other 737 MAX failing by Boeing that has come to light. (I hesitate to "buy" that narrative but I cannot refute it, either, so.....)
(Iv) nonetheless, having said all that, I think the record of Boeing's dishonesty after the Lion Air accident speaks adequately for itself. Boeing, which agreed to the DPA, wasn't charged with a crime relating to or involving its post-Lion Air acts and omissions. Perhaps your view is that corruption or similar malfeasance in the matters involving Ethiopia is so significant that the crash victims' families' legal offensive against the DPA should be thrown aside. But the statutory provisions in question, .... I'll just say, I would disagree.
Hey, thanks for waiving off snark and so on, & for tolerating some from my end.
With the YT example of the trim-runaway: This is just a different situation. A trim-runaway "keeps running", as in the YT. The MCAS run-away just stops, whenever the pilot does do a manual trim, to sneaky restart again, after a couple of seconds. Looks a little similar, though completely different at the overall functional level.
As said, it's difficult discussing with Mech Eng, when non-relevant aspects are promoted to "the cause of the ....".
1) Boeing knew that a step to trim back to level before hitting the cutout was not in the emergency response checklist: did they modify it - NO
2) Boeing knew that MCAS would keep coming back for another bite 5s after the last trim input but a pilot could safely use the trim if they hit the cutout within 5s afterwards: they did share that - NO
3) Boeing knew that if there was an unreliable airspeed situation after take-off, leaving the flaps out would inhibit MCAS and allow a safe landing: did they share that - NO
4) Boeing knew that they had modified the trim architecture so that the pilots first response of pulling back on the column would no longer inhibit AND trim as it did in the NG and every other 737: did they share that - NO
Only half a speed-brake
I was not aware of that last one, thanks for sharing. The clarity of your post is outstanding, BTW.
my attempt:
A) Boeing at that time did not know that
B) Boeing Commercial at that time had forgotten they were an aircraft manufacturer.
</end>
Being one, amongst many other consequences, carries the responsibility of not letting the A) above happen. That was violated.
[While it's a sin to lose marbles, inventory on how many went missing shall be maintained at all times]
Many may argue the top floor responsible for avoiding A) was hired and incentivized to feed the shareholders with cash but without the objective of building exquisite vehicles as an irrevocable and the only priority. While that is understood, in my book it's a zilch excuse for failing to govern.
my attempt:
A) Boeing at that time did not know that
B) Boeing Commercial at that time had forgotten they were an aircraft manufacturer.
</end>
Being one, amongst many other consequences, carries the responsibility of not letting the A) above happen. That was violated.
[While it's a sin to lose marbles, inventory on how many went missing shall be maintained at all times]
Many may argue the top floor responsible for avoiding A) was hired and incentivized to feed the shareholders with cash but without the objective of building exquisite vehicles as an irrevocable and the only priority. While that is understood, in my book it's a zilch excuse for failing to govern.
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Yes, soarbum, that "pilot stuff" was what I'd been trying to say in previous exchanges to/from MechEngr. . . . .
I doubt I'll ever be able to express sufficient gratitude and appreciation for being allowed to participate in this forum. There is zero chance I could have derived those four specific items from the parts of the subject of which I have some understanding. In other words thank you for that post.
WR 6-3
I doubt I'll ever be able to express sufficient gratitude and appreciation for being allowed to participate in this forum. There is zero chance I could have derived those four specific items from the parts of the subject of which I have some understanding. In other words thank you for that post.
WR 6-3
Even Fox news would have trouble keeping a straight face telling that porkie...
1) Boeing knew that a step to trim back to level before hitting the cutout was not in the emergency response checklist: did they modify it - NO
2) Boeing knew that MCAS would keep coming back for another bite 5s after the last trim input but a pilot could safely use the trim if they hit the cutout within 5s afterwards: they did share that - NO
3) Boeing knew that if there was an unreliable airspeed situation after take-off, leaving the flaps out would inhibit MCAS and allow a safe landing: did they share that - NO
4) Boeing knew that they had modified the trim architecture so that the pilots first response of pulling back on the column would no longer inhibit AND trim as it did in the NG and every other 737: did they share that - NO
1) Boeing knew that a step to trim back to level before hitting the cutout was not in the emergency response checklist: did they modify it - NO
2) Boeing knew that MCAS would keep coming back for another bite 5s after the last trim input but a pilot could safely use the trim if they hit the cutout within 5s afterwards: they did share that - NO
3) Boeing knew that if there was an unreliable airspeed situation after take-off, leaving the flaps out would inhibit MCAS and allow a safe landing: did they share that - NO
4) Boeing knew that they had modified the trim architecture so that the pilots first response of pulling back on the column would no longer inhibit AND trim as it did in the NG and every other 737: did they share that - NO
In retrospect I would have made the Emergency AD one line: UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE DISABLE ELECTRIC TRIM.
What you meant was that Boeing and the FAA didn't repeat the contents of the Lion Air Preliminary report in the AD. Read Appendix D of the ET-302 final report of the Multi Operator Message which was issued on 10 NOV 2018 to see what Boeing did publish.
While it might have seemed to be a secret to those who don't own or operate 737 MAX aircraft - per Appendix H, Captain Seifu (Senior Vice President of Flight Operations at Ethiopian Airlines) got a reply on Dec 3, 2018 about his inquiry over the 5 second delay on Nov 28, 2018. which he understood from a conference call with Boeing. Curiously he remarked about following the UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED procedure, which the ET-302 crew also didn't follow.
It is a puzzle - what sense is there, when one has a stall warning, to retract the flaps?
The AD does mention to use the control column and main electric trim to manage the pitch attitude and it indicates that the electric trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces. Clearly failing to follow the stall warning procedure, doing the opposite of what is detailed there, would anyone expect that flight training 101 instructions about neutralizing trim forces would have helped?
In the FDR it is clear that the pilots did respond with electric counter trim, within 12 seconds the first time and about 6 seconds on the second MCAS increment, but left between 60 and 100 pounds of pull on the control column, even though the electric trim was reducing the control force at the time they gave that up.
Why would a pilot not continue to trim out the excessive force? Would that have been a reasonable prediction?
More important, the AD also says, quite clearly, "ensuring the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are set to CUTOUT and stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the flight."
"and stay in the CUTOUT position" seems important.
Until the crew re-enabled the trim to apparently try to re-enable the autopilot (specifically an item to be disabled when a stall warning and stick shaker is running under the UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED procedure) the plane was gaining altitude, about 2000 Feet per Minute. After going against the AD they tried electric trim twice and the stabilizer moved both times, then autopilot warning was given which would have been only from pushing the enable button and then, 6 seconds after what they tried failed, MCAS ran for 4 seconds until the plane pitched down and the AoA sensor was likely in range. They did not attempt to retrim that increment as they apparently focused solely on pulling.
The main reason they had trouble with control was failing to handle the stall warning / UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED by taking full control of the wheel, control column, and throttle.
They never performed in the simulator to demonstrate solid capacity to comply with an AD issued as a direct result of a crash.
More important, no discussion about what Captain Seifu (Senior Vice President of Flight Operations at Ethiopian Airlines) did following that conference with Boeing in regards to training, discussions with his company pilots, or any other factor, appears in the Final Report. He knew about the 5 second delay - there is no evidence he told any pilot at Ethiopian.
Now that it is clear that all relevant information was supplied to Ethiopian Airline by Boeing before the ET-302 crash, all those details supposedly withheld.
---
There was no requirement for Ethiopian to fly the MAX after the AD. That was a voluntary choice, to put an airplane with a latent defect into service knowing that their pilots had no follow-up training and were provided with only the AD, that the management had felt was inadequate. The lack of detail on how the unreliable airspeed training was insufficient such that two pilots with apparently recent training did every step incorrectly is troubling.
Instead of focusing on the runaway stabilizer in the AD, the crew would have been served better if training was provided about the effect of MCAS activation.
The previous sentence is from the Final report, not me, in case there was concern. The airline was responsible for providing that training.
22. While the autopilot was engaged, systems were supplied by the erroneous LH AOA values. The A/P failed to fly to the target altitude resulting in accelerated speed. After reaching a maximum altitude of around 9,100 ft (right baro corrected altitude) the Airplane started to descend;
23. The A/P disconnected automatically after remaining engaged for 32 seconds;
24. The activation of MCAS followed by GPWS aural alert with ongoing stick shaker, coupled with no failure flag or warning to indicate that the auto throttle has failed to transition to climb thrust at the critical phase of flight indicate that multiple happenings taking place simultaneously because of the overlapping effects of the erroneous AOA inputs;
25. The Stall Management Yaw Damper Computer -1 (SMYDC 1) computed a LH minimum operational speed and a LH stick shaker speed greater than VMO (340Kt) without any alert or invalidity detection;
23. The A/P disconnected automatically after remaining engaged for 32 seconds;
24. The activation of MCAS followed by GPWS aural alert with ongoing stick shaker, coupled with no failure flag or warning to indicate that the auto throttle has failed to transition to climb thrust at the critical phase of flight indicate that multiple happenings taking place simultaneously because of the overlapping effects of the erroneous AOA inputs;
25. The Stall Management Yaw Damper Computer -1 (SMYDC 1) computed a LH minimum operational speed and a LH stick shaker speed greater than VMO (340Kt) without any alert or invalidity detection;
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"just to move the blame away from the company"
The company accepted full blame. What Boeing doesn't want is to have 20,000 relatives of relatives of relatives coming up with reasons they should have been considered and dragging the proceeding out for a decade.
"the deliberate deceit after Lion Air"
Source for that?
How does it compare with "They followed the procedure exactly" a year before issuing a report that showed they did not follow even a single step (because steps are order dependent) correctly?
This is what runaway stabilizer presents as on the Classic - prior to the NG - prior to the MAX - that's how old this procedure is and how training is supposed to be. Note the startling warning horn.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pPRuFHR1co
The company accepted full blame. What Boeing doesn't want is to have 20,000 relatives of relatives of relatives coming up with reasons they should have been considered and dragging the proceeding out for a decade.
"the deliberate deceit after Lion Air"
Source for that?
How does it compare with "They followed the procedure exactly" a year before issuing a report that showed they did not follow even a single step (because steps are order dependent) correctly?
This is what runaway stabilizer presents as on the Classic - prior to the NG - prior to the MAX - that's how old this procedure is and how training is supposed to be. Note the startling warning horn.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pPRuFHR1co