Missing light aircraft in the NT
2 Cessna 210 aircraft have "broken up" recently from my memory - as well as many in the long past (many had struts).
My info recalls one had a crack & could have been from a corrosion point - ALL 210 and similar aircraft had VERY DETAILED inspections. 68 Carry thru were removed from service AND all other after NDT deemed SAFE as per the manufacturer.
Again you need to supply your "aging aircraft breaking up" it is NOT HAPPENING.
Then it is about 59ish not 60 over the trip.
Unless they have a SOP for Lean of Peak for take off n climb.
Every Top End operator looked at LOP years back - the ones still around today, gave up on it a decade ago (except maybe 1).
Unless they have a SOP for Lean of Peak for take off n climb.
Every Top End operator looked at LOP years back - the ones still around today, gave up on it a decade ago (except maybe 1).
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Can you post some info to support this?
Again you need to supply your "aging aircraft breaking up" it is NOT HAPPENING.
So it’s been 4 days, no doubt the people that need to know all involved and I feel for them, I truly do.
So why are the company name and rego being protected? I just don’t get it.
Why don’t the media seem to care?
We know if it was one of the big boys it would be all guns blazing.
Perplexed.
So why are the company name and rego being protected? I just don’t get it.
Why don’t the media seem to care?
We know if it was one of the big boys it would be all guns blazing.
Perplexed.
The complete lack of respect I see from some on this forum and from some in the industry in general, especially in situations such as these, not only for the families and friends of the deceased, but for the work colleagues alike, is quite honestly astounding.
Many, many people are hurting. Real people read the words you post here, including the family and friends of those affected. Before you post anything, have a good hard think about how your words may affect those who’ve had their whole world turned upside down
Many, many people are hurting. Real people read the words you post here, including the family and friends of those affected. Before you post anything, have a good hard think about how your words may affect those who’ve had their whole world turned upside down
I was that pilot 20 something years ago flying the same type of aircraft over the same route. As were many others here. It could have been me. It could have been many others here.
Just this afternoon, I spent 20 minutes at FL390 over the NT swapping old war stories (ours and others’) with my FO about VFR 210s at night around the NT in the wet. We - somewhat blackly - joked we got out unscathed. Just.
I hate reading about young pilots killed in GA. Weirdly the older I get the more it hits me. They could be my kids.
It shouldn’t still be happening.
I luckily worked for NT companies where I could and did say no. The first time I was in fear of losing my job. But the boss was understanding (“no problems, grab an hotel room and we’ll see you in the morning”). I have no doubt that this saved my life that day in similar conditions.
The company culture was such that I f I had an extra 0.4 on the MR if I had to go 30nm left and right of track or backtrack to get out of a blind alley it wasn’t challenged.
To be clear, I have no idea of the operator here as no rego so am not lobbing accusations at it or the pilot from the comfort of my flight deck.
I theorise that with the industry in such rapid movement there is a dearth of experienced mentors in the top end to push back against the inevitable corporate pressure and promote safety.
VFR across Arnhem Land in a monsoonal trough is not a walk in the park.
Young pilots need to be protected by a system. I was lucky. I had mentoring - albeit informal but through pilots that had done a couple of wet seasons - and support and backed by a company culture of not being penalised for doing what is safe on the day. I knew I could say no or divert.
RIP young aviator whose wings never saw their full potential and your passenger. Let’s hope this time around your loss is not in vain. Whatever the cause be it mechanical or otherwise I hope the industry learns from it.
Last edited by compressor stall; 29th Dec 2022 at 10:01. Reason: Ageing eyes and small phone.
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Moderator
A few folks are getting a tad confused when it comes to old aircraft. The problem is not being old, per se, but what that old aircraft has had done to it during the time that it got to be old.
On the structural side of things, there's lots of fancy detailed engineering stuff which goes into the stressing design of the aircraft which we can sideline for pilot talk.
The main concern is the size of the tin bits which are holding the aircraft together - in particular, the thickness of the important bits. As part of the certification, the OEM will do a bunch of sums which are proved correct during structural testing. The link to the thread on Bob Tait's website to which I referred earlier in turn links to a Boeing structural test which is well worth a watch to get an idea of the sort of stuff which the OEM does as part of the certification workup for an aircraft Type.
The end result for the initial certification is that the aircraft is shown to be OK. The problem now becomes one of ensuring that it continues to be OK as time goes by (the buzzword term is "continuing airworthiness"). So, what might be the main concerns ?
The problem is that most of the important tin bits are subject to damage associated with what we call structural fatigue. The basic problem is that the materials are somewhat microscopically imperfect when they are made during the various metallurgical processes involved in making the end products which the OEM uses to build the various aircraft structural components. As the structure is subjected to in-service operational loads, these microscopic imperfections can move around in the parent material and, eventually, enough join up to create micro voids (tiny cracks) which then get bigger with continuing operational use. As they get bigger, the structural item concerned becomes structurally weaker. Unless we can detect these problems and fix them before they get to critical states, we run the risk of bits of aircraft breaking in flight and taking everyone quite by surprise.
Related problems, such as corrosion (think "rust"), serve to accelerate (sometimes quite rapidly) the development of fatigue problems. Corrosion is a bit of a mongrel problem both at the design stage and then during ongoing maintenance. Some designs are better than others but, at the end of the day, it becomes an ongoing matter for the diligence of the maintainer folk to whom we all owe our continuing existence as being both alive and pilots ....
We have techniques, developed over the years, which are used in the certification and continuing airworthiness world to address these structural concerns. But, and that is a big but, it all depends on everyone doing their bit to contribute to the overall gameplan.
An underlying and critically important presumption is that the aircraft is operated and maintained in a manner consistent with the OEM's design assumptions. If that is not the case, then we can get to a stage where all bets are off and the OEM's assumptions and maintenance requirements no longer fit the problem. It is a matter of great regret that sometimes real world reality doesn't match the OEM's presumptions regarding its perception of what the real world should be like. In such situations, we can find structural fatigue degradation reality rapidly outpacing the OEM's presumptions which are built into the maintenance programs. The end result, occasionally, can be inflight catastrophic structural failures and an aircraft hull loss.
Such failures can be associated with, say, thunderstorm penetration ranging down to simple flight downwind in the circuit on a nice sort of day. Glen Donovan's Nomad loss, 30-odd years ago, now, was an example of the latter and is why I always utter silent profanities when I see or hear of folks operating GA normal category aircraft in an inappropriately cavalier manner.
The reality is that we do have unexpected inflight structural failures and that, sometimes, these are contributed to by inappropriate operation of the aircraft over its lifetime.
On the structural side of things, there's lots of fancy detailed engineering stuff which goes into the stressing design of the aircraft which we can sideline for pilot talk.
The main concern is the size of the tin bits which are holding the aircraft together - in particular, the thickness of the important bits. As part of the certification, the OEM will do a bunch of sums which are proved correct during structural testing. The link to the thread on Bob Tait's website to which I referred earlier in turn links to a Boeing structural test which is well worth a watch to get an idea of the sort of stuff which the OEM does as part of the certification workup for an aircraft Type.
The end result for the initial certification is that the aircraft is shown to be OK. The problem now becomes one of ensuring that it continues to be OK as time goes by (the buzzword term is "continuing airworthiness"). So, what might be the main concerns ?
The problem is that most of the important tin bits are subject to damage associated with what we call structural fatigue. The basic problem is that the materials are somewhat microscopically imperfect when they are made during the various metallurgical processes involved in making the end products which the OEM uses to build the various aircraft structural components. As the structure is subjected to in-service operational loads, these microscopic imperfections can move around in the parent material and, eventually, enough join up to create micro voids (tiny cracks) which then get bigger with continuing operational use. As they get bigger, the structural item concerned becomes structurally weaker. Unless we can detect these problems and fix them before they get to critical states, we run the risk of bits of aircraft breaking in flight and taking everyone quite by surprise.
Related problems, such as corrosion (think "rust"), serve to accelerate (sometimes quite rapidly) the development of fatigue problems. Corrosion is a bit of a mongrel problem both at the design stage and then during ongoing maintenance. Some designs are better than others but, at the end of the day, it becomes an ongoing matter for the diligence of the maintainer folk to whom we all owe our continuing existence as being both alive and pilots ....
We have techniques, developed over the years, which are used in the certification and continuing airworthiness world to address these structural concerns. But, and that is a big but, it all depends on everyone doing their bit to contribute to the overall gameplan.
An underlying and critically important presumption is that the aircraft is operated and maintained in a manner consistent with the OEM's design assumptions. If that is not the case, then we can get to a stage where all bets are off and the OEM's assumptions and maintenance requirements no longer fit the problem. It is a matter of great regret that sometimes real world reality doesn't match the OEM's presumptions regarding its perception of what the real world should be like. In such situations, we can find structural fatigue degradation reality rapidly outpacing the OEM's presumptions which are built into the maintenance programs. The end result, occasionally, can be inflight catastrophic structural failures and an aircraft hull loss.
Such failures can be associated with, say, thunderstorm penetration ranging down to simple flight downwind in the circuit on a nice sort of day. Glen Donovan's Nomad loss, 30-odd years ago, now, was an example of the latter and is why I always utter silent profanities when I see or hear of folks operating GA normal category aircraft in an inappropriately cavalier manner.
The reality is that we do have unexpected inflight structural failures and that, sometimes, these are contributed to by inappropriate operation of the aircraft over its lifetime.
Moderator
So why are the company name and rego being protected?
If the comment relates to PPRuNe constraints, we are protecting no-one. Indeed, as the mod who constrained the posts, I still have no idea who the operator or the pilot was. Just as soon as names are in the public domain, you can refer to them. In the meantime, though, please do have a bit of regard for the family and friends who are in the initial stages of a most unpleasant grieving process. It's unfortunate that the Christmas break probably is contributing to the delays in publicity but that, surely, will be resolved before too long. Just take a few deep breaths and bide your time until it is appropriate to name names in the clear.
If the comment relates to PPRuNe constraints, we are protecting no-one. Indeed, as the mod who constrained the posts, I still have no idea who the operator or the pilot was. Just as soon as names are in the public domain, you can refer to them. In the meantime, though, please do have a bit of regard for the family and friends who are in the initial stages of a most unpleasant grieving process. It's unfortunate that the Christmas break probably is contributing to the delays in publicity but that, surely, will be resolved before too long. Just take a few deep breaths and bide your time until it is appropriate to name names in the clear.
Flying is inherently dangerous. Once you leave the ground, the journey back to earth may not be what you expected. It is sometimes out of our control. But mostly it isn’t.
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John, I have a great deal of respect for those who have gone before me. Both survived it and those who haven't. Could be me tomorrow. I'd love to understand more about the real causes of these breakups, ALL of the factors. Not just the standard trotted out rubbish. I read regularly the Chieftain breakup north of Condoblin. The survey 210 and the A300 out of New York, personally I need to constantly remind myself of consequences, of the things I have control over and the things I haven't. The more things I can into the 'things I can control' bucket the better.
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John,
Nope, not having a go at you or Prune.
I am genuinely perplexed as to how the rego and company name is not out there. Ok it’s pretty obvious from the posts above it’s Katherine Aviation if that’s what KA stands for as I’m sure it’s not the IATA KA coded airline.
I have no skin in the game apart from like many here cut my teeth in the Territory. Back then it was certainly well publicised and printed when an accident happened, yes even before the hallowed halls of the interweb became so popular.
If you see the feeling of many posters it’s not having a go at the pilot, it’s having a go how how and why was a relatively new pilot to the Top End (again speculation) trained to deal with a long flight in monsoonal weather in a VFR aircraft? Many have admitted to being lucky, to having got away with things, the way we did ****e in the past has however evolved.
Back in the day being handed keys to the plane and off you go, she’ll be right and oh look out for xyz was kinda the way. There was no safety manager, no accountable manager, no manager accountable to the accountable manager to be accountable to the accountable manager. In todays operations with the added levels of management I would have thought that systems etc would be in place in every company.
Gone are the cowboy days, gee they were fun though! I think most will get the point I’m making.
RIP young fellla, let’s hope this wakes up the systematic failure. I however doubt it!
Nope, not having a go at you or Prune.
I am genuinely perplexed as to how the rego and company name is not out there. Ok it’s pretty obvious from the posts above it’s Katherine Aviation if that’s what KA stands for as I’m sure it’s not the IATA KA coded airline.
I have no skin in the game apart from like many here cut my teeth in the Territory. Back then it was certainly well publicised and printed when an accident happened, yes even before the hallowed halls of the interweb became so popular.
If you see the feeling of many posters it’s not having a go at the pilot, it’s having a go how how and why was a relatively new pilot to the Top End (again speculation) trained to deal with a long flight in monsoonal weather in a VFR aircraft? Many have admitted to being lucky, to having got away with things, the way we did ****e in the past has however evolved.
Back in the day being handed keys to the plane and off you go, she’ll be right and oh look out for xyz was kinda the way. There was no safety manager, no accountable manager, no manager accountable to the accountable manager to be accountable to the accountable manager. In todays operations with the added levels of management I would have thought that systems etc would be in place in every company.
Gone are the cowboy days, gee they were fun though! I think most will get the point I’m making.
RIP young fellla, let’s hope this wakes up the systematic failure. I however doubt it!
Moderator
As Frank Borman observed, "a superior pilot uses his superior judgement to avoid situations which require the use of his superior skill"
We have all frightened ourselves witless during our younger days in the air. The eternal problem is how to survive that transition and acquire enough smarts to keep our noses clean while we get to a place where we have a reasonable chance of identifying hazards before they get to kill us.
The introduction of better supervision and mentoring is the best change in recent years - one just has to look at the extent to which our military brethren have reduced their mishap rates in an hazardous environment.
The reduction in guidance material generally, such as the loss of the local crash comics, years ago, hasn't helped.
There is no simple fix it answer, we all just have to do what we can to contribute to the solution rather than the problem.
So far as the story's details, if we can just keep it a bit under control until the details are in the public domain, that would be appreciated. This applies, especially, to identifying pilot details. I have no inside information but it is not inconceivable that relatives are yet to be contacted, given that many folks are away on holidays.
We have all frightened ourselves witless during our younger days in the air. The eternal problem is how to survive that transition and acquire enough smarts to keep our noses clean while we get to a place where we have a reasonable chance of identifying hazards before they get to kill us.
The introduction of better supervision and mentoring is the best change in recent years - one just has to look at the extent to which our military brethren have reduced their mishap rates in an hazardous environment.
The reduction in guidance material generally, such as the loss of the local crash comics, years ago, hasn't helped.
There is no simple fix it answer, we all just have to do what we can to contribute to the solution rather than the problem.
So far as the story's details, if we can just keep it a bit under control until the details are in the public domain, that would be appreciated. This applies, especially, to identifying pilot details. I have no inside information but it is not inconceivable that relatives are yet to be contacted, given that many folks are away on holidays.
one just has to look at the extent to which our military brethren have reduced their mishap rates in an hazardous environment
A lad on his first job starting work at the beginning of the wet, even with the most liberal and caring of operators, is on a very, very steep learning curve. We've all had that learning experience which we were fortunate to survive. RIP young man and pax.
Last edited by megan; 29th Dec 2022 at 23:28.
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It also shows up as a 208 but TFT was a 210N. Many operators wish to suppress their aircraft tracks, that could have been a hold over from the planes previous operator.
Guys…..
Although all this talk of Va, fatigue and so on is a valid discussion to have in general, I think it’s a bit premature in the case of this accident. Apart from one or two very inconclusive media photos, there is nothing that I am aware of to indicate what the cause of the accident was. So why are we all talking about in flight break ups, when we have no idea yet if that is even what happened?
A couple of the previous accidents mentioned in this thread were pretty close to home for me, and I fully agree that this is a conversation that we, as an industry, need to have at some stage. But I also know how aggravating it is, when you’ve just lost a colleague or friend in a situation like this, to find yourself reading speculative online comments regarding the cause of the accident or PIC’s supposed lack of knowledge or training, when the people commenting are not yet in a position to know. Out of professional respect for the PIC and their family, friends and colleagues, I would humbly suggest that we hold off on this discussion until at least some of the facts are known.
Fly safe, everyone.
Although all this talk of Va, fatigue and so on is a valid discussion to have in general, I think it’s a bit premature in the case of this accident. Apart from one or two very inconclusive media photos, there is nothing that I am aware of to indicate what the cause of the accident was. So why are we all talking about in flight break ups, when we have no idea yet if that is even what happened?
A couple of the previous accidents mentioned in this thread were pretty close to home for me, and I fully agree that this is a conversation that we, as an industry, need to have at some stage. But I also know how aggravating it is, when you’ve just lost a colleague or friend in a situation like this, to find yourself reading speculative online comments regarding the cause of the accident or PIC’s supposed lack of knowledge or training, when the people commenting are not yet in a position to know. Out of professional respect for the PIC and their family, friends and colleagues, I would humbly suggest that we hold off on this discussion until at least some of the facts are known.
Fly safe, everyone.
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Guys…..
Although all this talk of Va, fatigue and so on is a valid discussion to have in general, I think it’s a bit premature in the case of this accident. Apart from one or two very inconclusive media photos, there is nothing that I am aware of to indicate what the cause of the accident was. So why are we all talking about in flight break ups, when we have no idea yet if that is even what happened?
A couple of the previous accidents mentioned in this thread were pretty close to home for me, and I fully agree that this is a conversation that we, as an industry, need to have at some stage. But I also know how aggravating it is, when you’ve just lost a colleague or friend in a situation like this, to find yourself reading speculative online comments regarding the cause of the accident or PIC’s supposed lack of knowledge or training, when the people commenting are not yet in a position to know. Out of professional respect for the PIC and their family, friends and colleagues, I would humbly suggest that we hold off on this discussion until at least some of the facts are known.
Fly safe, everyone.
Although all this talk of Va, fatigue and so on is a valid discussion to have in general, I think it’s a bit premature in the case of this accident. Apart from one or two very inconclusive media photos, there is nothing that I am aware of to indicate what the cause of the accident was. So why are we all talking about in flight break ups, when we have no idea yet if that is even what happened?
A couple of the previous accidents mentioned in this thread were pretty close to home for me, and I fully agree that this is a conversation that we, as an industry, need to have at some stage. But I also know how aggravating it is, when you’ve just lost a colleague or friend in a situation like this, to find yourself reading speculative online comments regarding the cause of the accident or PIC’s supposed lack of knowledge or training, when the people commenting are not yet in a position to know. Out of professional respect for the PIC and their family, friends and colleagues, I would humbly suggest that we hold off on this discussion until at least some of the facts are known.
Fly safe, everyone.