EMIRATES A380 BNE
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While there may not be a mystery as to WHAT happened, what are the possible ramifications of this event? What is the potential for more significant damage to the aircraft and its occupants?
And how should this event have been handled by the crew? Passengers describe a significant sound attached to this event. Was the cockpit crew aware that something had happened? Someone in the cabin crew must have heard the noise as well. One would assume that the cockpit was notified.. The event occurred 30-45 minutes after takeoff, so close to cruising altitude.
If the cockpit could have seen the damage to the aircraft, I assume that they would have returned to DXB at that point in the flight.
And how should this event have been handled by the crew? Passengers describe a significant sound attached to this event. Was the cockpit crew aware that something had happened? Someone in the cabin crew must have heard the noise as well. One would assume that the cockpit was notified.. The event occurred 30-45 minutes after takeoff, so close to cruising altitude.
If the cockpit could have seen the damage to the aircraft, I assume that they would have returned to DXB at that point in the flight.
I highly doubt inside the bay Airbus has installed infrastructure that could cause significant airframe issues should a wheel decide to cause problems. I don't believe much more significant damage would have occurred beyond this, however let the engineers answer that one.
If the cockpit could have seen the damage to the aircraft, I assume that they would have returned to DXB at that point in the flight
With the lack of info they had available, its either hold for 8 hours, or continue to BNE. First option you will never get in trouble for. I understand holding for such a timeframe is extremely unpopular with the punters down the back, and potential pressure from other pilots next to you against such a long winded hold, but I can't say I've ever seen a training department throw the book at someone for making that call.
Last edited by PoppaJo; 3rd Jul 2022 at 00:35.
Thats a wing/body fairing in an unpressurised part of the aircraft. Absent any way convenient way to actually visualise that damage why would the crew return an apparently normal aircraft back to DXB?
PoppaJo, you've been flying the 737 too long. The 380 has fuel dumping capability.
PoppaJo, you've been flying the 737 too long. The 380 has fuel dumping capability.
From memory only, I recall the Super cannot jettison fuel to get below MLW. Ie- you will land with 40/50/60T still too heavy, hence the long hold to burn (should one elect to land below in a circumstance). CG Limit is reached with significant fuel on board, cannot offload further unless one wants further issues. I am sure the A380 drivers can elaborate more.
My apologies then Poppa. On other types Airbus gives lots of latitude to land over weight if needed. I can’t imagine that landing 40 tonnes over would be a big deal if needed. In this case how would you reconcile a hypothetical subjective report from the cabin if the aircraft was flying normally, no leaks or vibrations and no cargo fire warnings?
Anyway, I like the magic nosewheel bolt theory. It introduces an element of fantasy to how we previously understood aerodynamics.
Anyway, I like the magic nosewheel bolt theory. It introduces an element of fantasy to how we previously understood aerodynamics.
The Aviation Herald reported a missing bolt and end cap from the nose gear.
It also reported that the crew suspected a blown tyre on take-off.
It also reported a hole in the wing root fairing,
Aviation Herald made no linkage to any event causing the other.
However, one could link the events logically and speculate that the bolt and/or end cap fell off during the takeoff roll and damaged one of the centre gear tyres which exploded after gear retraction.
As far as A380 Emergency Procedures go, possibly the only indication that the crew had was an ECAM telling them that the tyre pressure was low and WHEEL page showing the actual low pressure or XX if the sensor was damaged.
A380 FCOM says that abnormal action for WHEEL TIRE PRESSURE LO > Crew Awareness
It also reported that the crew suspected a blown tyre on take-off.
It also reported a hole in the wing root fairing,
Aviation Herald made no linkage to any event causing the other.
However, one could link the events logically and speculate that the bolt and/or end cap fell off during the takeoff roll and damaged one of the centre gear tyres which exploded after gear retraction.
As far as A380 Emergency Procedures go, possibly the only indication that the crew had was an ECAM telling them that the tyre pressure was low and WHEEL page showing the actual low pressure or XX if the sensor was damaged.
A380 FCOM says that abnormal action for WHEEL TIRE PRESSURE LO > Crew Awareness
Last edited by FlexibleResponse; 3rd Jul 2022 at 06:03.
You don't subscribe to The Aviation Herald's theory of a missing bolt from the NLG??!?
That's to say, in the absence of any evidence I don't subscribe to the theory that the two events are necessarily connected (npi).
Aviation Herald is great at reporting facts, but its efforts at analysis are frequently less successful, often concluding that 2 + 2 = 5.
The flight crew knew because they mentioned it when they were landing to have emergency services on standby because they blew a tire. They probably didn't know the extent because it would seem more logical to land at their mainbase where it would be easier for repairs to be made to the aircraft, compared to a 'remote' (compared to main base) location
Question from a non-pilot but (ex) aerodynamicist: Wouldn't such a hole affect the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft; asymmetrical drag, increased fuel burn, noise, buffeting etc? Clearly not perceptible to the pilots in this case, but I expect that a rigorous examination of the data would show some deviation from "normal" flights?
Question from a non-pilot but (ex) aerodynamicist: Wouldn't such a hole affect the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft; asymmetrical drag, increased fuel burn, noise, buffeting etc? Clearly not perceptible to the pilots in this case, but I expect that a rigorous examination of the data would show some deviation from "normal" flights?
B747's at hot/high heavy airports used to routinely blow body gear tyres at rotate, they would mainly shred the pack fairings, and we would find out by the ATC reports. The old reef runway at Hickalulu also used to have lots of 747 tyre pieces around the runway, and bits of fairings. stopping using retreads at least on the body gear reduced lots of annoyance. At least 744s would tell you that a tyre had failed, the classic left it to the imagination.
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When you look at the damage the skin is ripped off and outward along a zipper row of fasteners and bent forward … and remained bent that way for many hours in flight…
suggests a significant overpressure (build up) acting inside to out …
a hole in a fairing would not immediately get me excited… if no lines of any kind would be cut … and the pressure fuselage has no damage …
Common sense suggests that for the pilots the difficult thing would be to find out the presence and level of:
1. first damage … for example a bolt flying,
2. immediate second damage … for example a tire being blown as a consequence, …( but they did not report a flat until now and the photo does not show that)… where the pressure (or frags) rips off a piece of fairing,
3. delayed third damage… for example minor damage by either 1. or 2. which initially does not show up on instruments but can get worse over time … for example lines or skin damage progressing… especially when it hit a weak spot ..
So even with a mild event it would be wise to more closely monitor instruments, let a pilot or dead header do a walk around in the cabin/fuselage, instruct the ccw to report unusual issues, … for such a long flight and over water the risk of 3. increases and the workload for pilots increases,
burning fuel and reducing weight reduces other risks, … for example with gear damage…
next to continue or return/divert an option would be to change your route in flight to pass closer to acceptable airports… when that’s not possible, based on criteria, it might be wise to divert or return…
A late flight engineer always told me helping in cases like this was the main function of an FE … his favourite example being a long tear in a wing/surface, where the pilots wanted to ground and he said no problemo …
So it’s up to the pilots these days to find the proper compromise.
And an interesting case for pilotless flying design studies.
For example (one of many questions based on this incident alone) … does a future “aircraft system (which today still includes aircraft plus pilots plus ccw plus (some knowledgable) passengers)” have to recognise that “something” happened, instead of recognising that a “specific thing” happened…and how does that compare with a piloted aircraft (also see the remark above about pilots being surprised about the degree of damage after landing).
suggests a significant overpressure (build up) acting inside to out …
a hole in a fairing would not immediately get me excited… if no lines of any kind would be cut … and the pressure fuselage has no damage …
Common sense suggests that for the pilots the difficult thing would be to find out the presence and level of:
1. first damage … for example a bolt flying,
2. immediate second damage … for example a tire being blown as a consequence, …( but they did not report a flat until now and the photo does not show that)… where the pressure (or frags) rips off a piece of fairing,
3. delayed third damage… for example minor damage by either 1. or 2. which initially does not show up on instruments but can get worse over time … for example lines or skin damage progressing… especially when it hit a weak spot ..
So even with a mild event it would be wise to more closely monitor instruments, let a pilot or dead header do a walk around in the cabin/fuselage, instruct the ccw to report unusual issues, … for such a long flight and over water the risk of 3. increases and the workload for pilots increases,
burning fuel and reducing weight reduces other risks, … for example with gear damage…
next to continue or return/divert an option would be to change your route in flight to pass closer to acceptable airports… when that’s not possible, based on criteria, it might be wise to divert or return…
A late flight engineer always told me helping in cases like this was the main function of an FE … his favourite example being a long tear in a wing/surface, where the pilots wanted to ground and he said no problemo …
So it’s up to the pilots these days to find the proper compromise.
And an interesting case for pilotless flying design studies.
For example (one of many questions based on this incident alone) … does a future “aircraft system (which today still includes aircraft plus pilots plus ccw plus (some knowledgable) passengers)” have to recognise that “something” happened, instead of recognising that a “specific thing” happened…and how does that compare with a piloted aircraft (also see the remark above about pilots being surprised about the degree of damage after landing).
Last edited by A0283; 3rd Jul 2022 at 12:48.
From memory only, I recall the Super cannot jettison fuel to get below MLW. Ie- you will land with 40/50/60T still too heavy, hence the long hold to burn (should one elect to land below in a circumstance). CG Limit is reached with significant fuel on board, cannot offload further unless one wants further issues. I am sure the A380 drivers can elaborate more.
No fuel dump on A380 ?
Don't believe.
